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Abstract 
 
I exploit the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 as a shock to U.K. firms’ cost of doing 
business in order to study the effect of bribes on firm value. Around the Act’s passage, U.K. 
firms operating in high-corruption countries display a drop in value. However, their non-
U.K. competitors in these countries exhibit an increase in value. U.K. firms respond to the 
Act by reducing the expansion of their network of subsidiaries into perceptively corrupt 
countries. Moreover, compared to their non-U.K. competitors, U.K. firms’ sales in such 
countries grow 12 percentage points slower and their merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activity declines. Taken together, I show that bribes facilitate doing business in certain 
countries. Imposing unilateral anti-bribery regulations on some firms benefits their 
unregulated competitors.  
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Corruption reduces levels of investment and ultimately economic growth (e.g., Mauro 1995).1 Indeed, the 
World Bank estimates that corruption costs $2.6 trillion (5% of global GDP) per year, with $1 trillion 
paid in bribes every year. Corruption in the form of bribery is also widespread across firms. According to 
a survey of more than 11,000 firms from 125 countries, one in three firms believes their competitors use 
bribes to secure public procurement contracts (D’Souza and Kaufmann 2011).2 In an attempt to fight 
corruption, some developed nations have implemented unilateral regulations punishing the use of bribes; 
other nations like India have not. Opponents of unilateral anti-bribery regulation argue that such 
regulations put affected firms at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis their unregulated competitors 
because bribes often facilitate doing business in certain countries. 
Despite their prevalence in business transactions around the globe, relatively little is known about 
the causal effect of bribes on firm value. An important challenge with this research agenda is that bribes 
are largely unobserved. From 1978 to early 2013, only 143 bribery-related enforcement actions were 
initiated against publicly listed firms by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) for violations of the 1977 U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA; 
Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2015).  
In this paper, I examine whether the ability to use bribes creates firm value. To this end, I employ 
a quasi-experimental design that allows me to study the market reaction of firms that are subject to a 
plausibly exogenous increase in their cost of doing business in perceptively corrupt countries. 
Specifically, I exploit the passage of the draft of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 on March 25, 2009. The U.K. 
Bribery Act, enforced since July 1, 2011, imposes substantial increases in penalties for firms and 
managers found to be using bribes. Moreover, the Act requires firms to implement internal controls aimed 
at preventing the use of bribes. 
                                                 
1
 Reviews of the literature on corruption and growth are provided by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Bardhan (1997), and Svensson 
(2005). 
2
 Estimates of the cost of corruption and bribes paid are obtained from reports by the World Bank Institute and based on 2001-
2002 survey data. Firm-level statistics on bribery are based on the 2006 Executive Opinion Survey conducted by the World 
Economic Forum.   
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In theory, if firms use bribes as an investment to increase the probability of winning positive net 
present value (NPV) contracts, then the U.K. Bribery Act may curtail some profitable business, thereby 
reducing the value of regulated firms. Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986), for instance, model bribes 
as a side payment within Vickrey’s (1961, 1962) first-price auction framework. In this framework, firms 
make side payments to increase the probability of winning contracts tendered by corrupt government 
officials. Imposing costly anti-bribery regulation may impact some firms negatively and act to transfer 
their business to their unregulated competitors (Beck and Maher 1989). 
However, while anti-bribery regulation might create firm value in some instances, it is not ex ante 
clear that this is always the case. For instance, a corruptible firm manager in charge of tendering a 
contract might assign that contract to an inefficient subcontractor who offers him/her a side payment. In 
this case, anti-bribery regulation could serve as an external monitoring device that makes accepting bribes 
costly to the manager, thereby aligning his/her incentives with shareholders’. Along these lines, Desai, 
Dyck, and Zingales (2007) show that increased tax enforcement enhanced the value of Russian oil firms. 
Anti-bribery regulation may further increase firm value through its impact on compliance, internal control 
systems, and competitive strategy. 
Exploiting the passage of the draft of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 on March 25, 2009 is 
appropriate only if it resolved residual uncertainty about anti-bribery regulation being passed and if it had 
a substantial effect on firms. One can plausibly argue that these criteria are fulfilled for at least three 
reasons. In the first place, the Act’s passage on March 25, 2009 was not covered by the media until that 
day. Second, the fines assessed for violating the Act are much higher than the fines stipulated in previous 
legislation in the United Kingdom, by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention, or by comparable legislation in the United States. The Act imposes 
open-ended fines on corporations found not to have implemented internal anti-bribery controls, as well as 
on firms found to have paid bribes and on the individuals responsible for the bribery, both inside and 
outside the U.K. Third, the Act unexpectedly runs counter to precedent as it also applies to foreign firms 
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with U.K. operations. This provision makes it harder for U.K. industry lobbyists to argue that the Act 
places U.K. firms at a disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign competitors. Thus, the Act imposes substantial 
unexpected fines on the use of bribes. Taken together, these factors facilitate my investigation of the 
extent to which bribes affect firm value. 
To examine the importance of bribes for firm value, I focus on publicly listed firms. I measure 
firm value by calculating abnormal returns around passage of the U.K. Bribery Act. I investigate firms’ 
propensity to engage in bribery by using a variable named Corruption exposure, which combines firm-
level subsidiary locations with Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index to measure 
firms’ exposure to high-corruption countries. My findings are based primarily on 1,097 U.K. firms and 
9,457 non-U.K. firms. I further explore channels through which the U.K. Bribery Act affects firms using 
data on subsidiary locations and revenues, merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, and joint venture (JV) 
activity between 2007 and 2012. 
There are three key findings. First, the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act did indeed adversely 
affect the value of U.K. firms. U.K. firms that are one standard deviation more exposed to perceptively 
corrupt countries than average firms have 0.7% lower abnormal returns around passage of the Act, 
reflecting a loss in market value of $12.9 million for each such firm. One example illustrating a one 
standard deviation difference in Corruption exposure is given by a comparison between a U.K. firm with 
seven subsidiaries in the U.K. and an otherwise comparable U.K. firm that operates six subsidiaries in the 
U.K. and one subsidiary in Russia.  
Second, the U.K. Bribery Act had positive effects on direct competitors of U.K. firms that do not 
fall under the provisions of the Act. I define direct competitors as non-U.K. firms that operate at least one 
subsidiary within (i) the same non-OECD country and (ii) the same industry as at least one U.K. firm. 
Competitors do not have to comply with the Act if they do not have a U.K. subsidiary. I document that, 
around the passage of the Act, direct competitors of U.K. firms that do not fall under the provisions of the 
Act had 0.5% higher abnormal returns than comparable non-U.K. firms. This effect is almost twice as 
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large for direct competitors headquartered outside of OECD countries, suggesting that direct competitors 
headquartered in the least regulated countries benefited the most. In sum, this finding suggests that the 
U.K. Bribery Act transferred business from affected firms to firms that are not covered by the Act. 
Third, I document responses to the U.K. Bribery Act. I find that U.K. firms opened fewer 
subsidiaries in non-OECD countries after passage of the Act and their revenues grew 12 percentage points 
slower than those of non-U.K. firms in these countries. These effects are even stronger in those non-
OECD countries perceived to be most corrupt according to Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index. I also document that, relative to non-U.K. firms, M&A activity by U.K. firms outside 
the OECD increased 6-8 percentage points slower. One might suspect that U.K. firms substituted direct 
ownership with third-party transactions; however, I do not find evidence that U.K. firms circumvented the 
Act by engaging increasingly in JVs in perceptively corrupt countries. This may be because internal 
control requirements are particularly stringent for such third-party transactions, as highlighted in recent 
U.K. Bribery Act investigations.3  
The empirical setting—passage of the U.K. Bribery Act—might subject my results to alternative 
interpretations that are unrelated to bribes. For instance, it is possible that U.K. firms found it optimal to 
withdraw from perceptively corrupt countries when faced with substantial costs for implementing 
effective internal anti-bribery controls without having used bribes in the first place. However, one of the 
Act’s features that is specific to non-U.K. firms allows me to alleviate this concern. Notably, non-U.K. 
firms are exempted from the internal control requirements stipulated in Section 7 of the Act (i.e., they are 
not required to implement costly control systems). Nevertheless, I find that non-U.K. firms affected by 
the Act due to their exposure to the U.K. and to perceptively corrupt countries through subsidiary 
presence are negatively affected by the Act.  
 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, “Serious Fraud Office launches corruption inquiry into Airbus” in Financial Times (online), August 7, 2016. 
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A further potential interpretation, which certainly merits consideration, is that negative market 
response and subsequent withdrawal from perceptively corrupt countries reflect firms’ decisions to reduce 
expected legal costs and exposure to potential legal liabilities. It appears that such an increase in expected 
penalties is most binding for bribe-paying firms. 
Note that any estimate of the magnitude of the effect of bribes on firm value from passage of the 
U.K. Bribery Act is likely conservative. For one thing, as stated earlier, anti-bribery regulation may have 
some positive effect on firm value through its impact on corporate governance, compliance, and 
competitive strategy. To this end, I document that the costs of anti-bribery regulation outweigh its 
benefits. Furthermore, it is possible that the Act was passed at a time when U.K. regulators expected less 
lobbying because the economic prospects of U.K. firms were generally less positive. In addition, firms 
may circumvent some of the costly implications of anti-bribery regulation by reorganizing in order to 
reduce their exposure. Despite evidence that the Act did not cause an immediate increase in joint venture 
activity, such strategic decisions might take time to filter through—and might take other forms that are 
harder to observe. Similarly, other equilibrium responses—investments in compliance, reorganizations, or 
spin-offs—may explain some of the muted response. Finally, the market may have priced in some 
expectation of legislation during prior attempts to pass anti-bribery regulation. I study such related events 
in the robustness section. 
A key contribution of this paper is to provide firm-level evidence of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010’s 
impact on foreign operations, such as revenue, opening and closing of subsidiaries, and M&A activity. So 
far, very few studies have documented implications of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 
1977 on aggregate U.S. exports (Graham 1984; Beck, Maher, and Tschoegl 1991), as well as aggregate 
foreign direct investment, aircraft exports, joint venture activity, and the capital/labor ratio (Hines 1995). 
Voluntary disclosure of sensitive foreign payments under the SEC’s voluntary disclosure program prior to 
passage of the FCPA came with negative abnormal returns (Smith, Stettler, and Beedles 1984).  
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More recent evidence from the Chinese anti-corruption campaign suggests that, although the 
campaign had little impact on corporate corruption culture (Griffin, Liu, and Shu 2016), state-owned 
enterprises benefitted (Lin et al. 2016) while providers of luxury goods and services suffered (Ke, Liu, 
and Tang 2016). While these papers focus on a very recent regulatory effort to fight corruption in a 
perceptively corrupt country, in this paper I add the cost of doing business to the list of drivers of foreign 
activity and international cross-border flows.4 
A few studies provide first insights into the potential benefits and costs of using bribes. For 
instance, analysis of 166 prosecuted international bribery cases revealed that a bribe of $1 returns $11 of 
contract value (Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis 2012). Yet, enforcement actions for violations of the FCPA 
are associated with costs that more than offset the value of contracts obtained through bribe payments if 
prosecution for bribery is accompanied by charges of financial fraud (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2015), 
although fines tend to be lower for socially responsible firms (Hong and Liskovich 2015). Even though 
detected bribery cases help identify benefits and costs associated with bribery, such cases may differ from 
undetected bribery cases along dimensions that correlate with the value they create. Also, using detected 
cases omits unsuccessful bribery attempts. Exploiting the passage of anti-bribery regulation, specifically 
the U.K. Bribery Act 2010, alleviates these concerns. Finally, survey data, although typically associated 
with concerns about selection, measurement error, and limited participant information, have helped 
document that using bribes is negatively correlated with firm growth (Svensson 2003; Fisman and 
Svensson 2007) and is more common among smaller firms (Bennedsen, Feldmann, and Lassen 2009). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I describe the event and the 
methodology, while in Section 2 I discuss the data. In Section 3, I report an event study conducted around 
the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act. Long-run implications of the Act for U.K. firms are analyzed in 
Section 4. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5. 
                                                 
4
 See, for example, studies of the determinants of international portfolio investment decisions (Brennan and Cao 1997; Kang and 
Stulz 1997; Graham et al. 2005; Portes and Rey 2005; Gianetti and Simonov 2006; Koh, Stulz, and Warnock 2009; Leuz, Lins, 
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1. Event and methodology 
In this section, I describe the event and the methodology. 
1.1 U.K. Bribery Act 2010 
The primary event date is March 25, 2009, which is when the draft of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 
was passed by a U.K. government commission and put forward by the Secretary of State for Justice. The 
draft received Royal Assent in almost unchanged form on April 8, 2010 and enforcement of the U.K. 
Bribery Act began on July 1, 2011.5 I identify March 25, 2009 as the event date by a Factiva keyword 
search of “bribery” and “United Kingdom” in major U.K. newspapers for the ten weeks surrounding 
March 25, 2009. There was no other significant regulatory development in the U.K. during that period. 
Figure 1 illustrates that news about the passage of the draft did not leak prior to the event day. 
[[ INSERT Figure 1 about Here ]] 
In order for March 25, 2009 to be a relevant event day, it is important to understand why the draft 
of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 passed on that day faced little risk of being watered down and why 
implications of the draft were unexpected at the time of its passage. Each will be discussed in turn. 
The draft of the U.K. Bribery Act passed on March 25, 2009 faced little risk of being watered 
down because the Labour Party was in charge of drafting the Act and had the political power needed to 
ensure its passage into legislation.6 Moreover, unlike previous attempts to implement anti-bribery 
regulation, in this case there was considerable pressure to act quickly: OECD sanctions were looming and 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Warnock 2009), cross-border M&As (e.g., Erel, Liao, and Weisbach 2012), and cross-listing decisions (e.g., Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz 2004).  
5
 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/pdfs/ukpga_20100023_en.pdf and http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/ 
legislation/bribery-act-2010-quick-start-guide.pdf for the Act’s official text and guidance provided by the Ministry of Justice. In 
the Factiva search, I remove “non-events,” that is, articles that do not constitute news, such as journalistic opinions on past 
events. I also exclude articles linked to bribery regulation elsewhere (e.g., in the U.S.) and those related to potential bribery cases 
as opposed to bribery regulation; examples include speculation about bribery of the Olympic Committee or bribery in cricket and 
football. One unrelated article prior to March 25 covers investigations into alleged bribery conducted by two U.K. employees in 
Nigeria; according to the article, these two individuals face charges under the U.S. FCPA of 1977. 
 
6
 The draft was passed by a government commission dominated by the Labour Party. Likewise, that party held the majority in the 
House of Commons (occupying 355 of the 646 seats in Parliament after the 2005 general election). Even though both the House 
of Commons (lower house) and the House of Lords (upper house) participate in the process of turning bills into Acts of 
Parliament, it is possible for a bill to be passed by the House of Commons if no agreement is reached between the houses. 
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there was also a relatively short time until the next general election. With election outcomes predicted to 
be unfavorable for the Labour Party, it was highly pressured to turn the Act into legislation quickly so as 
to avoid time-consuming amendments. Ultimately, the Act was pushed so hard that once turned into 
legislation, its enforcement had to be delayed twice because firms had not been provided with sufficient 
guidelines for implementation. Another reason why the draft faced little risk of falling through the 
legislative process is that industry lobbyists had a hard time arguing against the draft. Prior attempts to 
pass anti-bribery regulation were aimed solely at U.K. firms. This feature made previous attempts an easy 
target for industry lobbyists, who argued that enforcing any such anti-bribery regulation would be entirely 
at the expense of U.K. firms. A distinct and decisive feature of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 is that it also 
applies to non-U.K. firms with U.K. operations (such as subsidiaries), irrespective of where violations 
occur, which addresses lobbyists’ concerns. 
The implications of the Act were unexpected because the penalties stipulated in its draft were 
more severe than anticipated and went well beyond existing U.K. regulations, the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention of 1997, and the U.S. FCPA of 1977. Prior U.K. anti-bribery regulation—notably the Public 
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, the Criminal Cases Act 1908, and the Criminal Justice Act 1967—did 
not explicitly address bribery by corporations and focused on active and passive bribery of U.K. public 
officials only, while the U.K. Bribery Act addresses these issues.7 According to the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, signed by the U.K. in 1997, signatory countries agree to enact legislation that penalizes the 
bribing of foreign public officials. The U.K. Bribery Act extends beyond these requirements by making it 
a criminal offense (i) for individuals and corporations to engage in either active or passive bribery and (ii) 
for corporations to have no internal control procedures designed to prevent associated persons from acts 
of bribery. Furthermore, the Act prohibits facilitation payments: payments meant to induce government 
officials to perform tasks that they are obligated to perform in any case. Further, corporate fines for 
                                                 
7
 In the Act, active bribery is defined as offering, giving, or promising to give a financial or other advantage to a person in 
exchange for that person’s improper performance of a relevant function; this includes the bribery of foreign public officials and 
other firms. Conversely, passive bribery is defined as receiving or agreeing to receive a financial or other advantage in exchange 
for improperly performing a relevant function. 
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violating the Act are potentially open-ended; individuals who violate the requirements of the Act can be 
fined and imprisoned. Along these dimensions, the U.K. Bribery Act also goes well beyond the provisions 
of the FCPA, although U.K. organizations can defend against allegations by proving that they have 
adequate anti-bribery controls in place.8 
Up to 2015, there have been few charges under the U.K. Bribery Act 2010, yet these cases are 
illustrative of the strictness by which the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) seeks to punish violations of 
the Act. The first individual charged under the Act was a London-based court clerk who pleaded guilty to 
one count of taking a GBP 500 bribe so as not to put details of a traffic summons into a court database. In 
November 2011, he was sentenced to six years in prison, three years of which were for violations of the 
U.K. Bribery Act. The first charge against agents of a corporation came against four former employees of 
Sustainable AgroEnergy Plc and associated companies for bribery that occurred between April 2011 and 
February 2012 in association with selling biofuel investment products involving plantations in Southeast 
Asia. Three individuals were convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud, conspiracy to furnish false 
information, fraudulent trading, and Bribery Act 2010 offences. They were sentenced to 13, 9, and 6 
years’ imprisonment and disqualified from being directors for 15, 15, and 10 years, respectively.9 The low 
number of convictions is due to three features of bribery investigations. First, these investigations are 
diverse, complex, and lengthy, and often involve other jurisdictions. Second, the Act only applies to cases 
of bribery that occurred after June 2011. Third, the sensitivity of information revealed by the SFO makes 
it indispensable to keep preliminary investigations confidential until investigations are formally 
                                                 
8
 Specifically, the U.K. Bribery Act and U.S. FCPA differ along a range of dimensions. First, the U.K. Bribery Act (unlike the 
FCPA) stipulates that a firm is strictly liable if it fails to implement anti-bribery controls. Second, whereas the FCPA was initially 
interpreted to prohibit only active bribery, the U.K. Bribery Act proscribes both active bribery (offering a bribe) and passive 
bribery (accepting a bribe). Third, the FCPA focuses on bribing foreign public officials; in contrast, the U.K. Bribery Act covers 
the bribing of private persons as well as other firms and also the employees of those firms. Fourth, there is no formal upper limit 
for fines under the U.K. Bribery Act; under the FCPA, the maximum fine is $2 million. Fifth, of the two Acts, only the U.K. one 
criminalizes facilitation payments. Sixth, the U.K. Bribery Act’s jurisdiction explicitly extends to non-U.K. firms with U.K. 
operations, regardless of where the bribery occurs. The FCPA initially applied solely to U.S. firms and has only recently been 
interpreted as applying to foreign firms with U.S. operations. Sources: “The U.K. Bribery Act 2010– What U.S. Companies Need 
to Know” in Mondaq Business Briefing (June 21, 2010) and “The U.K. Bribery Act 2010 v Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977: How Different Are They & Should Your Business be Concerned?” in Mondaq Business Briefing (April 26, 2010). 
 
9
 The fourth person was acquitted of all charges. No charges were made against Sustainable AgroEnergy Plc or its parent 
company Sustainable Growth Group because Sustainable Growth Group was placed in administration in March 2012. 
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announced. Examples of particularly complex investigations include those into Securency International 
Pty Ltd (ongoing since 2011) and Harlequin Property (ongoing since 2013).10 
1.2 Empirical methodology 
One approach to studying the effect of bribes on firm value is to collect data on bribes paid, as well as the 
benefits received from paying bribes using data available from bribery cases detected by regulators. 
However, as outlined in the introduction, (i) detected cases may differ from undetected bribery cases 
along dimensions that correlate with the value they create, and (ii) using detected cases omits 
unsuccessful bribery attempts. To alleviate these concerns, I exploit the passage of anti-bribery regulation, 
specifically the U.K. Bribery Act 2010, and I construct a proxy for firms’ likelihood of using bribes from 
subsidiary data.  
In the first part of the analysis, I use event study methodology to examine whether bribes affect 
firm value. Specifically, I run the following regression: 
 
where CARi denotes the cumulative returns of firm i around the day of passage of the Act, CEi denotes a 
firm’s exposure to corrupt countries, and Xi is a vector of controls including industry fixed effects. The 
coefficient of interest ß1 captures whether exposure to corrupt countries impacts firm value around 
passage of the Act.  
One major prediction from auction theory with side payments and costly regulation is that 
unregulated non-U.K. firms competing directly with U.K. firms are positively affected by the passage of 
unilateral regulation (e.g., Beck and Maher 1989). I test this prediction using the following regression: 
 
where UK_COMPi measures the competition of non-U.K. firms with U.K. firms in perceptively corrupt 
                                                 
 
 
10
 The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) lists ongoing cases under https://www.sfo.gov.uk/our-work/our-cases/. 
)1(,'1 iii CECAR εγβα +++= iX
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countries, NO_UK_LINKi is a dummy variable equal to one if a non-U.K. firm has no exposure to the 
U.K., and Xi contains controls including country times industry fixed effects. Of particular interest is ß3, 
which indicates whether firms unaffected by the Act and competing with U.K. firms are differentially 
affected.  
In the second part of the analysis, I test for the long-run effects of the U.K. Bribery Act on U.K. 
firms by running a pooled panel regression, as follows: 
 
 
where Yi,t is an outcome for firm i at time t, EARLY_RESPONSEt is a dummy variable equal to one if an 
observation occurs between passage and enforcement of the Act, and LATE_RESPONSEt is a dummy 
variable equal to one if an observation occurs after the Act is enforced. UK_FIRMi denotes firms 
headquartered in the U.K. Xi,t is a vector that contains firm fixed effects. Of particular interest are 
coefficients ß2 and ß4, which denote whether firms headquartered in the U.K. respond differentially after 
passage and enforcement, respectively. In a key robustness test, I additionally augment this set-up by 
country times time fixed effects (which makes ß1 and ß3 redundant).  
Equation (1) uses heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the industry level. 
Equation (2) additionally clusters at the country level and equation (3) clusters at the year and country 
level.11 
2. Data 
In this section, I describe the sample and key variables. Appendix 1 contains detailed variable definitions. 
2.1 Sample 
For the first part of my analysis, I obtain subsidiary information from Orbis, stock return data from 
                                                 
11
 In equations (2) and (3), I use two-way clusters. I have experimented with various dimensions of clusters and obtained similar 
results. Clustering standard errors at the dimensions mentioned here generally produces the most conservative standard errors. 
)3(,'___
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Datastream/Worldscope, and accounting data from Osiris. Orbis collects, among others, ultimate 
ownership and subsidiary data on private and public firms headquartered around the globe. I start with 
26,094 unique publicly listed firms with at least one subsidiary owned to more than 50% in 2008.12 
Matching these firms to Datastream, I obtain 18,848 firms that are active in March 2009 and have price 
data for March 24-26, 2009.13 After merging these data with Osiris data, I obtain 12,906 firms (1,244 
headquartered in the U.K.) for which assets are larger than zero. For most of my analyses, I require at 
least 100 return observations during days [-294;-41] relative to March 25, 2009 so as to construct 
abnormal returns. After removing firms with insufficient return observations and penny stocks, this leaves 
a final sample of 1,097 firms headquartered in the U.K. and 9,457 firms headquartered outside the U.K.  
The second part of my analysis employs subsidiary data from Orbis, as well as M&A and joint 
venture (JV) data from Zephyr. Zephyr provides information on 238,384 M&As involving 95,877 unique 
acquirers and 29,815 JVs involving 12,472 unique partners for 2007-2012. I focus on M&As in which the 
acquirer is public and increases its share in the target to above 50%.  
2.2 Main variables  
All continuous variables described below are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, although the results 
are insensitive to these levels. 
Firm value. I measure the effect of the U.K. Bribery Act on firm value using cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) on the day of passage of the U.K. Bribery Act (March 25, 2009) and the day thereafter. I 
calculate returns on the basis of price changes between closing on March 24, 2009 and closing on March 
26, 2009. To calculate CAR[0;1], I follow Fama et al. (1969), although I use daily stock return data and 
control for firm size and the book-to-market ratio (Fama and French 1993), as well as momentum 
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 Orbis obtains information directly (e.g., from annual reports, private correspondence, company websites, and telephone calls) 
or through official bodies (e.g., from SEC filings, stock exchanges). As of 2008, Orbis contained close to 43.5 million active 
companies (54,000 thereof publicly listed). Of these, 1.3 million companies (29,900 thereof publicly listed) had at least one 
recorded subsidiary owned to more than 50%. Historical data for other years are obtained from Orbis DVDs. The Online 
Appendix shows how subsidiaries are distributed across geographic regions.  
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 In 2008, more than 20% of the firms listed in Datastream/Worldscope are inactive: Datastream/Worldscope does not remove 
such firms. I identify inactive firms as firms without price movements within 20 trading days prior to March 25, 2009. 
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(Carhart 1997). All portfolios are constructed using local stocks.14 The estimation period starts 294 days 
before the event and ends 41 days before the event.  
Corruption exposure. I do not have a direct measure of bribes paid, so I try to capture firms’ propensity 
to use bribes by constructing Corruption exposure from firms’ exposure to countries with high levels of 
perceived corruption. For each firm i, I combine two data sources as follows: 
,(10 ) ,i ci c
c C i
#Subsidiaries
Corruption exposure CPI
#Subsidiaries∈
 
= − × 
 
∑  
where CPIc is Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index of country c in 2008, 
,i c#Subsidiaries  is the number of subsidiaries headquartered in country c and owned by firm i in 2008, 
and i#Subsidiaries  is the total number of subsidiaries of firm i in 2008. By construction, this measure is 
increasing in firms’ exposure to corruption. It is bounded by [0.7; 8.9] because 10 − CPI is 10 − 9.3 = 0.7 
for the least corrupt countries (Denmark, Sweden, and New Zealand) and is 10 − 1.1 = 8.9 for the most 
corrupt country (Somalia). In the Corruption exposure measure, I assume that each subsidiary is equally 
important in creating firm value, yet the ideal measure would capture the fraction of value attached to 
certain countries of the world. I additionally employ subsidiary-revenue-weighted variations of the 
Corruption exposure measure.  
Long-run outcome variables. I consider long-run outcome variables using annual subsidiary, M&A, and 
JV data for the 2007-2012 period from Orbis and Zephyr. I aggregate firms’ revenues by country using 
subsidiary revenue data of subsidiaries held to 50% or more. The number of acquisitions (joint ventures) 
at the firm-year level is constructed for all firms that incur at least one acquisition (joint venture) between 
2007 and 2012. M&As are restricted to deals where the acquirer increases their share to more than 50% of 
the target; JVs are restricted to those with at least one public partner.  
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 I follow Ince and Porter (2006) in “cleaning” daily return data. Long–short portfolios based on size, book-to-market ratio, and 
momentum are constructed as described in Kenneth French’s data library, but for U.K. firms, I split size into the top 30% and the 
bottom 70% of firms in order to account for the skewed size distribution in the U.K. Results are not sensitive to these cut-offs. 
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Controls. Under the U.K. Bribery Act, some firms may incur compliance costs that are related to firm 
size, which is why I control for the natural logarithm of total assets. Also, some firms may incur a fixed 
per-subsidiary compliance cost under the Act. I therefore control for the natural logarithm of the number 
of subsidiaries. Some firms are more likely than others to be affected by the Act. A number of firms must 
also comply with other anti-bribery regulations, most notably the U.S. FCPA. US Link is a dummy 
variable equal to one if a firm is subject to the FCPA, which I infer in two ways: (i) from the Bank of 
New York’s list of ADRs, in combination with Worldscope data, and (ii) from subsidiary data to indicate 
whether firms have U.S. subsidiaries. Additionally, some firms voluntarily adhere to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) standards. Much like the Domini 400 Social Index for S&P 500 firms in the U.S., 
the FTSE Group publishes the FTSE4Good Index for firms in the U.K. Firms listed in this index are those 
that comply with certain environmental, human rights, social, and stakeholder relations criteria. 
FTSE4GOOD is a dummy variable identifying index constituents. Firms voluntarily adhering to CSR 
standards might be less affected by the Act.15 
Non-U.K. firms. I proxy for being subject to the U.K. Bribery Act using U.K. Link, a dummy variable set 
equal to 1 if a foreign firm has at least one subsidiary in the U.K. U.K. Competition is a dummy set equal 
to one if at least one of a non-U.K. firm’s non-OECD subsidiaries competes directly with a U.K. firm’s 
non-U.K. subsidiary. Direct competition is defined as two subsidiaries operating in the same industry and 
in the same non-OECD country.  
Robustness. In robustness tests, I also study raw returns and changes in Tobin’s Q. Moreover, I provide 
estimates using alternative measures of perceived corruption, all of which are defined in Appendix 1. 
2.3 Summary statistics 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Panel A shows that the equally-weighted CAR[0;1] for U.K. 
firms around the event date is -0.43%, suggesting more negative returns for small firms around the event. 
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 See Bénabou and Tirole (2010) and Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2014) for reviews of the literature on CSR and firm value. 
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In line with the notion that the Act may be more costly for firms exposed to perceptively corrupt 
countries, U.K. firms with foreign subsidiaries have more negative returns. The average (median) sample 
firm has 41.4 (9) subsidiaries in 2008 and roughly one in six U.K. firms are FTSE4GOOD constituents; 
38% of firms have a U.S. link through having an ADR (18%), a U.S. subsidiary (30%), or both. In order 
to account for the differences in firms that operate abroad, I repeat my main analysis for the subset of 
U.K. firms with foreign subsidiaries. 
 [[ INSERT Table 1 about Here ]] 
In Panel B of Table 1, I present summary statistics for the sample of non-U.K. firms. Non-U.K. 
firms with U.K. subsidiaries are less exposed to perceptively corrupt countries on average, are larger, and 
more likely to be cross-listed, to have U.S. exposure, and to be FTSE constituents than non-U.K. without 
U.K. subsidiary. Some of these differences are magnified because 40% of non-U.K. firms are smaller 
local firms without foreign subsidiaries. Roughly half of the revenues generated by non-U.K. sample 
firms outside of the OECD are in direct competition with subsidiaries owned by U.K. parents.  
Panel C of Table 1 provides subsidiary, M&A, and JV summary statistics for the 2007-2012 
sample period. An average sample firm has a Corruption exposure of 3.7 through its 21.7 subsidiaries; 
63% of subsidiaries, accounting for 73% of revenues, are located in OECD countries. The average sample 
firm conducts 1.8 M&As per year, three in four in OECD countries. Out of firms’ average 2.9 JVs, less 
than half (41%) of the targets are headquartered in OECD countries. 
3. The U.K. Bribery Act 2010 and firm value 
In this section, I document the results of event studies for U.K. firms and direct competitors of U.K. firms 
around March 25, 2009. 
3.1 U.K. firms 
Table 2 provides results for the full regression (1) for U.K. firms. The dependent variable is Cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) [0; 1] in columns (1)-(5) and Cumulative raw returns (CRR) [0; 1] in column 
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(6). Without further controls, Corruption exposure loads significantly negatively on abnormal returns 
with a coefficient of −0.72, i.e., firms that are more exposed to high-corruption countries have more 
negative abnormal returns around passage of the U.K. Bribery Act (column (1)). This result is robust to 
controlling for industry fixed effects and further firm-level controls, alleviating concerns that industry 
corruption levels or other firm-specific characteristics may drive the result. In the full specification 
(column (3)), an increase of one standard deviation in Corruption exposure is associated with a 0.73% (= 
0.79 × 0.93%) decline in firm value, which is equivalent to $12.9 million (= $1,772 million * 0.73%) for 
the mean firm. One example illustrating a one standard deviation difference in Corruption exposure is 
given by the comparison between a U.K. firm with seven subsidiaries in the U.K., with a Corruption 
exposure of 2.3 (= 10 − 7.7), and an otherwise comparable U.K. firm that operates six subsidiaries in the 
U.K. and one in Russia; this latter firm’s Corruption exposure is 3.1 = (10 − 7.7)*(6/7) + (10 − 
2.1)*(1/7)).  
[[ INSERT Table 2 about Here ]] 
As shown in Table 1, of the U.K. sample firms, 43.4% do not have subsidiaries outside the U.K.; these 
firms have a Corruption exposure of 2.3 by construction. The coefficient for Corruption exposure is still 
significantly negative when I re-run the main regression for firms with at least one foreign subsidiary 
(column (4)). The previous results are also confirmed when I repeat the main analysis using a Corruption 
exposure measure that weights subsidiaries by the fraction of revenues they generate (column (5)) and 
using raw returns as dependent variable (column (6)). 
None of the other control variables have significant power in explaining returns around the 
passage of the U.K. Bribery Act. The negative sign of the coefficients on FTSE4GOOD and US link are 
insignificant and may appear at odds with the predictions. However, these controls do not account for the 
fact that FTSE4GOOD constituents and U.S.-linked firms might be more exposed to perceptively corrupt 
countries on average, and may capture other negative news affecting all FTSE4GOOD constituents and 
all U.S. linked firms around March 25, 2009. The number of subsidiaries loads insignificantly negatively, 
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while size loads weakly positively.16 
For robustness, I repeat the analysis using alternative event days, event windows, measures of 
corruption exposure, measures of firm value, and a sample of non-U.K. firms. Results are presented in 
Appendix 2 and summarized in the following. First, Corruption exposure loads negatively on CARs over 
most event windows during which attempts to pass anti-bribery regulation in the U.K. were made (Panel 
A in Appendix 2). Stacking all events bearing news in favor of stronger regulation, I find that Corruption 
exposure provides significant explanatory power for abnormal returns on event days.  
In Panel B in Appendix 2, I show that the full effect of the draft on firm value occurs around 
March 25, 2009 rather than during eight weeks before and after the passage of the Act. In Panel C, I 
examine a range of alternative Corruption exposure measures. Neither excluding sovereign tax havens 
from the construction of Corruption exposure nor using Worldwide Governance Indicators’ Control for 
Corruption as a measure of corruption affects results. Firms more exposed to corrupt industries—through 
operating subsidiaries in perceptively corrupt industries—are also more negatively affected by the 
passage of the U.K. Bribery Act. The idea of this test is that bribery may be more common in certain 
industries. While industry fixed effects address this if subsidiaries operate in the same industry as their 
headquarter firms, it might be that some firms are more exposed to certain industries through their 
subsidiaries.  
The negative firm value reaction of U.K. firms is also reflected in long-term firm value measures 
(Panel D in Appendix 2). For the 2007-2012 sample period, I estimate a pooled panel regression using 
Tobin’s q and revenue growth as dependent variables. I document that Tobin’s q and the revenue growth 
of U.K. firms go down relative to non-U.K. firms, more so for U.K. firms with higher exposure to 
perceptively corrupt countries. I also investigate whether something else may have driven the negative 
market reaction of U.K. firms with high exposure to perceptively corrupt countries on March 25, 2009 by 
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 The results are unaffected by removing size and/or number of subsidiaries; the correlation between these controls is 0.53. 
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studying non-U.K. firms. Panel E of Appendix 2 shows that non-U.K. firms exposed to the U.K. Bribery 
Act—these are firms that have both a U.K. subsidiary and a high Corruption exposure exhibit more 
negative abnormal returns on the event date. I also find that the negative spillovers are more pronounced 
among OECD firms, which may reflect that firms headquartered in OECD countries face different 
detection probabilities and costs, prosecution and enforcement probabilities, and reputational losses, but 
also different levels of home country anti-bribery regulation.  
All results are also robust to a range of additional standard event study tests that are untabulated 
for brevity. First, I use non-U.K. indices to calculate CARs (Zhang 2007).17 Second, event-time clustering 
could bias the coefficient found for Corruption exposure. To alleviate this concern, I follow Karpoff and 
Malatesta (1995) in using seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs) to calculate CARs for portfolios of 
firms with different levels of exposure to perceptively corrupt countries. Third, results on related events 
(Panel A in Appendix 2) are robust when I allow slopes on Corruption exposure to shift on event days 
(following Schipper and Thompson 1983). Finally, the results reported in Table 2 are not sensitive to 
other specifications of the estimation period or different treatment of outliers. 
3.2 Direct competitors of U.K. firms 
I have shown that the U.K. Bribery Act reduced the value of U.K. firms with exposure to perceptively 
corrupt countries. I now examine spillovers of the U.K. Bribery Act on non-U.K. competitors of U.K. 
firms. In theory, costly anti-bribery regulation may transfers business from regulated firms to unregulated 
firms. 
Table 3 presents the results of regression (2), which tests whether non-U.K. firms with U.K. 
competitors but without exposure to the U.K. Bribery Act are positively affected by the Act. The variable 
of interest is the interaction between a dummy variable indicating whether subsidiaries owned by non-
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 Specifically, I follow specification (1a) in Zhang (2007), which contains contemporaneous Canadian, European, and Asian 
returns, as well as lead European and Asian returns. However, I do not use non-local indices in my main specification because, in 
a competitive setting with unilateral regulation, non-U.K. indices may reflect spillover and competitive effects. 
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U.K. firms compete directly with those owned by U.K. firms and a dummy variable indicating whether 
non-U.K. firms are exposed to the U.K. Bribery Act. I also control for non-U.K. firms’ Corruption 
exposure. This is important because competing with U.K. firms may be correlated with Corruption 
exposure.18  
[[ INSERT Table 3 about Here ]] 
The results in Table 3 show that increased exposure to U.K. competitors outside the OECD 
countries is associated with more positive CARs but only among non-U.K. firms that are not exposed to 
the U.K. Bribery Act through a U.K. subsidiary (columns (1) and (2)). Non-U.K. firms that are exposed to 
competition with U.K. firms through their non-OECD subsidiaries and not exposed to the U.K. Bribery 
Act have 0.51% more positive CARs around the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act.  
Non-U.K. competitors of U.K. firms may benefit through two channels. First, some unregulated 
competitors’ expected payoff from offering bribes may increase as regulated firms may decide to quit 
perceptively corrupt countries, resulting in a reduction in competition (e.g., Beck and Maher 1989). 
Second, competitors subject to anti-bribery regulation in their home country but nevertheless competing 
in corrupt countries may benefit because the U.K. Bribery Act levels the playing field.  
In an attempt to shed light on the channel driving the spillovers from U.K. to non-U.K firms, I 
split the sample by headquarter regions. For instance, firms headquartered in OECD countries likely 
adhere to the standards of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, while U.S. firms likely adhere to the even 
stricter provisions of the FCPA. I find that the positive effect of the U.K. Bribery Act on direct 
competitors is strongest among non-OECD firms (+0.97%), suggesting that firms presumably facing less 
stringent anti-bribery regulation benefit the most. The effect on OECD firms is insignificantly positive, 
and even less so for U.S. firms (columns (3)-(6) in Table 3). The main result is similar in magnitude when 
including non-U.K. firms that do not have non-OECD country subsidiaries (column (7)). 
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 Empirically, the correlation between U.K. competition and corruption exposure is less than 0.1 though. 
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One might argue that, rather than the presence of a direct competitor, the size of that competitor is 
a good proxy for potential business opportunities that become available to non-U.K. firms after passage of 
the Act. For each non-U.K. firm, I measure the size of competition from U.K. firms by the logarithm of 
sales made by those U.K. subsidiaries that compete directly with subsidiaries owned by respective non-
U.K. firms. As before, I focus on subsidiaries headquartered outside OECD countries. Indeed, I find that 
non-U.K. firms exposed to competition from larger U.K. subsidiaries prior to passage of the Act have 
more positive abnormal returns around the passage of the Act (column (8)). 
4. Long-run implications of the U.K. Bribery Act 
In order to shed more light on U.K. firms’ response to the U.K. Bribery Act, I examine U.K. firms’ 
response to the Act in terms of subsidiary locations and revenues, as well as M&A and JV activity.  
4.1 Geographic exposure 
An increase in the cost of doing business may affect the decision to open new subsidiaries or to continue 
operating existing ones in perceptively corrupt countries. I analyze whether the U.K. Bribery Act affects 
such decisions by examining whether there is a difference in geographic exposure between U.K. and non-
U.K. firms after the Act was passed. I use regression (3) to compare U.K. firms’ corruption exposure to 
that of non-U.K. firms over the 2007-2012 period.  
In Panel A of Table 4, I present the results of an analysis of firms’ Corruption exposure. In 
constructing the Corruption exposure variable, I weigh subsidiary countries using the 2008 Corruption 
Perceptions Index so that my results are not driven by changes in that index. I denote by Early-response 
the period after passage of the Act but before its enforcement (2009-2010) and Late-response for the 
years thereafter (2011-2012). 
[[ INSERT Table 4 about Here ]] 
I document in column (1) of Table 4, Panel A that, relative to 2007-2008, all sample firms 
significantly increased their exposure to perceptively corrupt countries by 0.083 in 2009-2010 and by 
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0.120 (i.e., a further 0.037) thereafter. Comparing the increase in corruption exposure by U.K. firms to 
that of non-U.K. firms, I find in columns (2) and (3) that U.K. firms increased their exposure more slowly 
than non-U.K. firms, respectively, even after controlling for industry times year fixed effects. This effect 
occurs immediately after the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act and does not reflect a pre-trend, as shown 
when including a pre-event dummy for U.K. firms in 2008 (column (4)).  
In Panel B of Table 4, I examine changes in the logarithm of the number of subsidiaries in and 
outside of OECD countries, as well as in countries that are among the 50 most corrupt countries according 
to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. All sample firms established more 
subsidiaries in OECD and non-OECD countries after 2009. During the Early-response and Late-response 
periods, the average sample firm increased its number of OECD subsidiaries by 19.1% and a further 
17.4% (= 0.365-0.191), and its number of non-OECD subsidiaries by 23.8% and a further 29.9%, 
respectively (columns (1) and (4)). Further, relative to non-U.K. firms, U.K. firms engaged relatively 
more in OECD countries right after the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act (columns (2)-(3)), and relatively 
less in non-OECD countries right after enforcement of the U.K. Bribery Act in 2011 (columns (5)-(6)). 
This latter effect is economically slightly stronger for subsidiaries in the 50 most corrupt countries 
(column (7)).  
Taken together, after passage of the U.K. Bribery Act, U.K. firms became relatively less exposed 
to perceptively corrupt countries and reduced their engagement in more corrupt countries.  
4.2 Revenues 
Above I document that the U.K. Bribery Act slowed down U.K. firms’ expansion into perceptively 
corrupt countries. In order to understand whether this development is associated with a drop in revenue or 
merely reflects closures of small subsidiaries, I analyze revenues from perceptively corrupt regions. I 
examine whether the revenue U.K. firms earned from corrupt countries grew more slowly than for non-
U.K. firms. In Table 5, the dependent variables are the sum of firms’ revenue by region using firm-level 
data (columns (1)-(5)) and revenue by surviving subsidiaries using subsidiary-level data (columns (6)-
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(7)). 
 [[ INSERT Table 5 about Here ]] 
As far as the revenue from OECD countries is concerned, all sample firms experienced an 
increase after passage of the U.K. Bribery Act and a further increase after enforcement. U.K. firms 
experienced a slightly more pronounced increase only during the early response period. This increase in 
revenue is robust to additionally controlling for industry times time fixed effects (columns (1)-(2)). 
In terms of revenue from outside of the OECD, the revenue for non-U.K. firms from such regions 
increased significantly faster than for U.K. firms after 2011 (i.e., after enforcement of the Act). 
Economically, after enforcement, the revenue of U.K. firms from non-OECD countries grew 11.9 
percentage points more slowly after controlling for time-variant industry and parent headquarter country 
characteristics (columns (3)-(4)). This effect is much more pronounced when focusing on revenue  from 
the 50 most corrupt countries. Revenue generated by U.K. firms from such countries grew 27.7 
percentage points more slowly after enforcement of the Act (column (5)). 
The structure of the Orbis data additionally enables analysis of subsidiary-level revenue data. 
This allows for making statements about U.K.-owned subsidiaries in perceptively corrupt countries after 
controlling for a wide range of subsidiary characteristics, alleviating concerns that U.K. subsidiaries are 
different. In column (6) of Table 5, I focus on surviving subsidiaries. Indeed, compared to subsidiaries 
owned by non-U.K. firms, subsidiaries owned by U.K. firms experience a drop in revenue of 14.5 
percentage points during the Late-response period even after controlling for subsidiary fixed effects. 
Further controlling for headquarter country times year and industry times year fixed effects, I find that the 
drop in revenue is significantly more pronounced among U.K.-owned subsidiaries headquartered in 
regions perceived to be more corrupt, as shown in column (7), which provides support for the previous 
results.  
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4.3 Mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures  
Above, I have shown that U.K. firms added fewer subsidiaries in perceptively corrupt countries than non-
U.K. firms after enforcement of the U.K. Bribery Act. I now examine whether one form of opening new 
subsidiaries—M&A activity—was affected, and whether firms circumvent the U.K. Bribery Act through 
JVs. 
Acquisitions in perceptively corrupt countries may be associated with additional costs, such as 
costs associated with the probability of such targets engaging in bribery regardless of internal controls.  
In Panel A of Table 6, I examine M&A activity around passage of the Act (2007-2012). The number of 
M&As with targets in OECD countries declined throughout the Early- and Late-response periods; this 
decline is pronounced for U.K. firms as much as for all sample firms (columns (1)-(2)). A different 
picture emerges from firms that are located outside OECD countries. While the number of M&As outside 
OECD countries during the early- and late-response periods hardly changed for non-U.K. sample firms, 
U.K. firms conducted 7.6% and 5.8% fewer such deals (columns (3)-(4)) during these periods. 
[[ INSERT Table 6 about Here ]] 
It is not ex ante clear whether U.K. firms engage more or less in JVs after the Act’s passage and 
enforcement. On the one hand, third-party transactions fall under the provisions of the U.K. Bribery Act; 
if JV partners are found to be engaged in bribery, U.K. firms are liable for their partners’ actions. On the 
other hand, it is harder to detect bribery by third parties and to link such activities back to U.K. firms.  
In Panel B of Table 6, I examine the number of JVs by target region for the 2007-2012 period. 
Overall, I document a reduction in the number of JVs inside OECD countries; this reduction is neither 
statistically significant nor more or less pronounced for U.K. firms relative to non-U.K. firms (columns 
(1)-(2)). Similarly, JV activity outside of OECD countries does not increase or decrease throughout the 
sample period, and decreases only insignificantly for U.K. firms during the late-response period (columns 
(3)-(4)). It should be noted that JV data are relatively sparse and potentially biased towards JVs that 
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occurred several years ago; also, JV data do not allow for statements about quality and types of JVs.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I show that passage of the U.K. Bribery Act on March 25, 2009 leads to a permanent drop in 
the value of U.K. firms, while the value of non-U.K. firms competing directly with U.K. firms increases. 
Furthermore, passage of the Act adversely affects U.K. firms’ economic activity in perceptively corrupt 
countries. My evidence is consistent with the notion that bribes facilitate doing business in certain 
countries. Imposing unilateral anti-bribery regulation on some firms hurts these firms but benefits their 
unregulated competitors. 
This paper constitutes a first step towards understanding the implications of unilateral anti-bribery 
regulation for regulated firms and their competitors. One important topic for future research is whether 
the regulatory punishment that can be meted out under the U.K. Bribery Act has implications for firm 
boundaries, such as decisions about whether or not to internalize customers or suppliers. Additionally, I 
focus on the costs and benefits to firms of anti-bribery regulations. Research on the social benefits and 
costs of the U.K. Bribery Act for the U.K. but also for perceptively corrupt countries can help depict a 
more complete picture of the motives for anti-bribery regulation and its implications. For instance, 
multinationals’ bribery decisions may be aimed at maximizing shareholder value, yet these decisions may 
have externalities on the environment within which firms operate. This reflects the possible tensions 
between firms making decisions in shareholders’ interest and governments seeking to correct distributive 
failures (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole 2010).  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
    
 Variable Description Data Source 
    
    
Firm value measures   
    
 
Cumulative abnormal 
returns [a;b] 
Cumulative daily abnormal returns in % from closing on day a-1 to closing of 
day b relative to some event date. Unless stated otherwise, the event date is 
March 25, 2009. Daily abnormal returns are obtained from parameters of a four-
factor Carhart (1997) model estimated over days [−294; −41] relative to event 
days. Excess return on the market is the return of the local index over and above 
the local risk-free rate. Size and book-to-market ratio are constructed using the 
cutoffs described in Kenneth French’s data library but using accounting data from 
Osiris; Momentum is constructed as described in Kenneth French’s data library 
using returns on two size portfolios and three momentum portfolios (2x3 = 6 
portfolios). 
Datastream 
    
 
Cumulative raw returns 
[a;b] 
Cumulative daily stock returns in % from closing on day a-1 to closing of day b 
relative to some event day. Unless stated otherwise, the event date is March 25, 
2009. 
Datastream 
    
 
Tobin’s q (MV of Total Equity+MV of Total Liabilities)/(BV of Total Shareholder Equity 
+BV of Total Liabilities). Regressions use the natural logarithm. 
Orbis 
    
Corruption exposure measures  
    
 
Corruption exposure 
(main measure) 
Combines, for each firm, subsidiary location data from Orbis with Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). For each firm, Corruption 
exposure is the sum—over all countries—of the percentage of the firm’s 
subsidiaries headquartered in the focal country in 2008 multiplied by the CPI of 
that country in 2008. The resulting sum is subtracted from 10 (the upper limit of 
the CPI) so that Corruption exposure is increasing in firms’ exposure to high-
corruption countries. This is the main measure used throughout the paper. 
Orbis, 
Transparency 
International 
(TI) 
    
 
Corruption exposure 
value-weighted by 
subsidiary revenues 
Constructed like the main Corruption exposure measure (see above) but 
additionally weighing by the fraction of revenues generated from firms’ 
subsidiaries. 
Orbis, TI 
    
 
Corruption exposure 
equally-weighted 
excluding tax havens 
Constructed like the main Corruption exposure measure but excluding territories 
characterized as tax havens as per OECD’s Grey List (as of August 17, 2009). 
Orbis, TI, 
OECD 
    
 
Corruption exposure 
equally-weighted using 
World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
Constructed like the main Corruption exposure measure but using the Control of 
Corruption measure provided by Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).  
Orbis, 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
    
 
Corruption exposure 
equally-weighted using 
BEEPS Survey Sector 
Corruption levels 
Constructed like the main corruption exposure measure but using subsidiaries’ 
industry corruption levels to weigh observations. Industry corruption levels are 
obtained from the 2009 version of the EBRD–World Bank Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). This survey was conducted in 
2008–2009 among 11,800 firms from 29 Eastern European and Asian countries. 
The corruption measure tabulates, by industry, the percentage of firms 
responding “major” (i.e., 4 on a 5-point scale) to this question: “please… 
[indicate whether this] factor is No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Moderate 
Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations 
of this establishment” when the factor in question is “corruption.” Respondents 
provide primary SIC codes, which are converted into the Fama–French industry 
classifiers. 
Orbis, World 
Bank Business 
Environment 
and Enterprise 
Performance 
Survey 
(BEEPS) 
    
 
Corruption exposure 
using BEEPS Survey 
Sector Corruption levels 
(value-weighted by 
subsidiary revenues) 
Constructed as before but additionally weighing by the fraction of revenues 
generated from firms’ subsidiaries. 
Orbis, World 
Bank 
Economic 
Survey 
    
 
Corruption exposure 
equally weighted using 
Transparency 
Constructed like the main corruption exposure measure but using Transparency 
International’s Sector Corruption measure associated with the industry of firms’ 
subsidiaries to weigh observations. 
Orbis, TI 
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International’s Sectoral 
Corruption levels 
    
 
Controls 
  
    
 
Market value Market value at the end of the calendar year.   
 
   
 
Assets Total assets. Regressions use the natural logarithm. Orbis 
    
 
# Subsidiaries Number of subsidiaries owned to more than 50%. Regressions use the natural 
logarithm. 
Orbis 
    
 
FTSE4GOOD For U.K. firms, this is a dummy set equal to 1 if a firm was part of the 
FTSE4Good U.K. Index in 2008. For non-U.K. firms, this is a dummy set equal 
to 1 if a firm was part of the FTSE4Good All Index in 2008. 
FTSE Group 
  
 
 
 
ADR A dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm has an ADR in the U.S. in March 2009 
or in the prior two years.  
BNY Mellon  
    
 
US subsidiary A dummy set equal to 1 if a firm has a U.S. subsidiary in 2008. Orbis 
    
 Beta The coefficient on market excess returns in a regression of firm excess returns on 
market excess returns over days [−294; −41] before March 25, 2009. 
Datastream 
    
 Market-to-book Market value in 2008 over book value in 2008. Orbis 
    
 Momentum Cumulative raw returns over the 6 months up to 41 days before March 25, 2009.  Datastream 
    
 
U.K. subsidiary A dummy set equal to 1 if a firm has a U.K. subsidiary in 2008. Orbis 
    
 
Foreign subsidiary A dummy set equal to 1 if a firm has a foreign subsidiary in 2008. Orbis 
    
 
Competes with U.K.    
  firm outside OECD 
A dummy variable set equal to 1 if at least one of a non-U.K. firm’s non-OECD 
subsidiaries competes directly with a U.K. firm’s subsidiary. A non-U.K. firm’s 
subsidiary is defined as competing directly with a U.K. firm if that subsidiary (i) 
is headquartered in the same non-OECD country as at least one U.K. firm’s 
subsidiary and (ii) operates in the same Fama-French 48 industry as that 
subsidiary. 
Orbis 
    
Subsidiaries, M&As, and JVs 
    
 
Number All The number of subsidiaries/M&As/JVs at the firm-year level. Restricted to 
subsidiaries held to more than 50%, M&As that lead to >50% control, and JVs 
involving at least one public partner. Regressions use the natural logarithm. 
Orbis, Zephyr 
 
   
 
% … in OECD % of subsidiaries/M&A targets/JV partners headquartered in OECD countries at 
the firm-year level. 
Orbis, Zephyr 
 
   
 
% Revenues OECD % of firm revenues from OECD subsidiaries at the firm-year level. Uses data 
from all subsidiaries.  
Orbis 
 
   
 
% Firms with OECD 
(non-OECD) … 
% of firms with at least one OECD (non-OECD) subsidiary/M&A/JV at the firm-
year level. 
Orbis, Zephyr 
 
   
 
Subsidiary revenues Average revenues obtained from a firm’s subsidiary at the subsidiary-year level. 
Restricted to surviving subsidiaries, i.e., subsidiaries with revenue data in the pre- 
early-, and late-response periods. Regressions use the natural logarithm. 
Orbis 
    
    
Time dummies   
    
 
Early-response A dummy set equal to 1 in years 2009 and 2010, i.e., in years during which the draft of the U.K. 
Bribery Act 2010 was passed by the government commission but not enforced. 
    
 
Late-response A dummy set equal to 1 in years 2011 and 2012 (i.e., years during which the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 
was enforced). 
    
Country classifications   
    
 
  OECD A dummy set equal to 1 if a firm is headquartered in/has a subsidiary in an OECD country. 
    
 
  OECD non-US A dummy set equal to 1 if a firm is headquartered in/has a subsidiary in an OECD country other 
than the U.S. 
    
 
  Non-OECD A dummy set equal to 1 if a firm is not headquartered in/does not have a subsidiary in an OECD 
country. 
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Appendix 2: Robustness tests 
 
 
This table provides robustness tests for the main results (Table 2). Panel A replicates the main result for alternative 
event dates. Each row shows the coefficient on Corruption exposure when replicating the main specification (Table 
2, column (3)) on a day with news concerning bribery regulation and the day thereafter. The left-hand side variable 
Cumulative abnormal return [0;1] is based on abnormal returns obtained relative to these alternative days. Events 
are derived from a Factiva search for “bribery” in U.K. newspapers. The table reports the coefficient for Corruption 
exposure constructed using Orbis data for the relevant year, using 2005 data for events prior to 2005. Besides the 
controls used in Table 2, the stacked regressions also contain date fixed effects multiplied with industry fixed 
effects, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. For the stacked regression with all events, values for 
CAR[0;1] of events with the predicted positive direction are multiplied by −1. Panel B replicates the main result 
(Table 2, column (3)) using alternative event windows around the event date to construct the dependent variable. 
Panel C replicates the main specification (Table 2, column (3)) using alternative geographic and industry-level 
measures of Corruption exposure. Panel D relates long-run measures of firm value and revenue growth to firm 
characteristics for a panel of firms for 2007-2012. In columns (1)-(2), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm 
of Tobin’s Q, and in Column (3), the dependent variable is Revenue growth. Corruption exposure is measured as 
before but held constant after 2009. Controls include the logarithm of total assets and fixed effects as denoted. 
Standard errors are clustered at the year and country level (2-way clusters). Panel E documents spillovers of the 
U.K. Bribery Act to non-U.K. firms with exposure to the U.K.. Columns (1)-(2) consider all sample firms, columns 
(3)-(4) consider sample firms headquartered in the OECD (excluding the U.K.), and columns (5)-(6) consider firms 
headquartered outside the OECD. The dependent variable is Cumulative Abnormal Returns relative to March 25, 
2009 (when the draft of the U.K. Bribery Act was passed) and the next day. Country fixed effects interacted with 
industry fixed effects (Fama–French 48) are included. Standard errors are clustered at the country and industry level. 
Appendix 1 provides detailed variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Alternative bribery-related events 
 
Date Headline/Content Source 
Predicted 
direction 
Corruption 
exposure 
# Obs 
03/30/2000 OECD urges U.K. to toughen anti-
bribery laws 
The Guardian - -0.241% 852 
05/23/2000 U.K. government to announce new 
laws aimed at bribery crackdown 
The Guardian; 
Financial Times 
- 0.344% 843 
06/21/2000 U.K. home secretary announces new 
anti-bribery law 
The Independent; 
The Guardian 
- -0.535%** 829 
11/09/2001 U.K. Government announces 
measures to tackle international 
corruption, proposes tightening 
bribery laws, pushes for crack-down 
on bribery by Britons abroad 
Associated Press 
Newswires; 
Evening News - 
Scotland 
- -0.513%* 978 
09/02/2002 British anti-corruption plans branded 
toothless 
The Guardian + -0.103% 996 
03/25/2003 U.K. government issues draft 
corruption bill 
WMRC Daily 
Analysis 
- 0.072% 993 
08/01/2003 Corruption bill faces delay over 
loopholes 
Financial Times + 0.043% 1,072 
02/18/2004 U.K. government backtracks over 
bribery 
Financial Times + -0.052% 1,112 
12/09/2005 Corruption laws to be overhauled in 
the U.K. 
Global Insight 
Daily Analysis 
- -0.073% 1,219 
11/19/2008 Bribery law reform plans focus on 
overseas work of businesses; 
managers face jail in bribery cases 
(published 20/11/2008) 
The Times; Press 
Association 
National Newswire; 
The Guardian; The 
Daily Telegraph 
- -0.121% 1,367 
07/20/2010 Clark delays enforcement of bribery 
law 
Financial Times + 0.109% 1,244 
01/31/2011 U.K. delays enforcement of U.K. 
Bribery Act 2010 by 3 more months 
The Wall Street 
Journal; Reuters 
+ -0.030% 1,286 
Stacked regressions     
 All events with positive direction  1 0.040% 5,710 
 All events with negative direction  -1 -0.337%*** 7,081 
  All events   -0.223%* 12,791 
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Panel B: Alternative event windows 
 Around Event  Before Event  After Event 
 
 
CAR 
[-10;10] 
CAR 
[-1;+1]  
CAR 
[-40;-11] 
CAR 
[-10;-1] 
CAR 
[-2;-1]  
CAR 
[+2;+3] 
CAR 
[+2;+10] 
CAR 
[+11;+40] 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Corruption Exposure -0.848* -0.988**  -0.006 0.001 0.008  0.023 -0.029 0.007 
 (-1.89) (-2.21)  (-0.29) (0.00) (0.09)  (0.25) (-0.72) (0.40) 
           
Constant & Controls Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
           
N 1,097 1,097  1,097 1,097 1,097  1,097 1,097 1,097 
Adj. R2 0.110 0.061  0.140 0.103 0.075  0.052 0.088 0.070 
 
Panel C: Alternative measures of corruption exposure  
 
 Geographic measures  Industry measures 
 Using 
Transparency 
International 
Corruption  
Measure 
Using Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
Corruption Measure 
 Using World Bank  
BEEPS Survey 
Corruption Measure 
Using World Bank  
BEEPS Survey 
Corruption Measure 
Using Transparency 
International’s Sectoral  
Corruption Measure 
       
 Equally-weighted  
by subsidiary count  
excl. tax havens 
Equally-weighted 
using Orbis 
subsidiary count 
 Equally-weighted 
by #subsidiaries in 
sector 
Value-weighted by 
subsidiary revenues in 
sector 
Equally-weighted by 
#subsidiaries in sector 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Corruption -0.925** -2.003*  -1.146* -1.027* -0.603 
  Exposure (-2.27) (-1.80)  (-1.79) (-1.75) (-0.34) 
       
Controls Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry 
FE 
Y Y  Y Y Y 
       
N 1097 1068  753 753 477 
Adj. R2 0.053 0.017  0.008 0.010 0.038 
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Panel D: Long-term firm value implications 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s q   Revenue growth 
 (1) (2)   (3) 
      
Early-Response X U.K. Firm -0.090***     
 (-3.70)     
      
Late-Response X U.K. Firm -0.024*     
 (-2.10)     
      
Corruption Exposure X Early-
Response X U.K. Firm 
 
-0.058** 
  
-0.020 
  (-3.05)   (-1.10) 
      
Corruption Exposure X Late-
Response X U.K. Firm 
 
-0.040* 
  
-0.060*** 
  (-2.09)   (-4.30) 
      
Early-Response -0.058     
 (-0.74)     
      
Late-Response -0.097     
 (-1.27)     
      
Corruption Exposure X Early-  0.018**   -0.026** 
  Response  (3.15)   (-2.01) 
      
Corruption Exposure X Late-  0.004   -0.031** 
  Response  (0.65)   (-2.38) 
      
      
Controls Y Y   Y 
Firm FE Y Y   Y 
Year FE N -   - 
Country X Year FE N Y   Y 
      
      
N 105,062 105,062   94,866 
Adj. R2 0.762 0.770   0.655 
      
 
  
 
Panel E: Spillovers of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 on non-U.K. firms with U.K. exposure 
 All non-U.K. firms  OECD non-U.K. firms  Non-OECD firms 
 CAR[0;1] CAR[0;1]  CAR[0;1] CAR[0;1]  CAR[0;1] CAR[0;1] 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
Corruption exposure -0.067 -0.024  -0.157 -0.060  0.104 0.153 
    (-0.59) (-0.20)  (-0.93) (-0.34)  (0.75) (1.03) 
         
U.K. Subsidiary (dummy) -0.063 0.874*  -0.182 1.246*  0.708 1.840 
 (-0.30) (1.65)  (-0.80) (1.82)  (1.40) (1.59) 
         
Corruption Exposure X   -0.326**   -0.529**   -0.277 
  U.K. Subs. (dummy)  (-2.01)   (-2.26)   (-1.07) 
         
Constant & Controls Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Country X Industry FE Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
         
         
N 9,457 9,457  6,955 6,955  2,502 2,502 
Adj. R2 0.151 0.151  0.121 0.121  0.248 0.248 
         
 
31 
 
References 
Bardhan, Pranab, 1997, “Corruption and development: A review of issues”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 35, 1320-1346. 
Beck, Paul J. and Michael W. Maher, 1986, “A comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets”, 
Economic Letters, 20, 1-5. 
Beck, Paul J. and Michael W. Maher, 1989, “Competition, regulation and bribery”, Managerial and 
Decision Economics, 10, 1-12. 
Beck, Paul J., Michael W. Maher, and Adrian E. Tschoegl, 1991, “The impact of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act on U.S. exports”, Managerial and Decision Economics, 12(4), 295-303. 
Bénabou, Roland and Jean Tirole, 2010, “Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility”, Economica, 
77, 1-19. 
Bennedsen, Morten, Sven A. Feldmann, and David Dreyer Lassen, 2009, “Strong firms lobby, weak firms 
bribe – A survey-based analysis of the demand for influence and corruption”, Working paper. 
Brennan, Michael J. and H. Henry Cao, 1997, “International portfolio investment flows”, Journal of 
Finance, 52(5), 1851-1880. 
Carhart, Mark M., 1997, “On persistence in mutual fund performance”, Journal of Finance, 52(1), 57-82. 
Cheng, Ing-Haw, Harrison Hong, and Kelly Shue, 2014, “Do managers do good with other people’s 
money?”, SSRN Working Paper. 
Cheung, Yan Leung, R. Raghavendra Rau, and Aris Stouraitis, 2012, “How much do firms pay as bribes 
and what benefits do they get? Evidence from corruption cases worldwide”, NBER Working Paper Series. 
D’Souza, Anna E. and Daniel Kaufmann, 2011, “Who bribes in public contracting and why? Worldwide 
evidence from firms”, SSRN Working Paper. 
Desai, Mihir A., Alexander Dyck, and Luigi Zingales, 2007, “Theft and taxes”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 84, 591-623. 
Doidge, Craig, G. Andrew Karolyi, and René Stulz, 2004, “Why are foreign firms that list in the U.S. 
worth more?”, Journal of Financial Economics, 71, 2005-238. 
Erel, Isil, Rose C. Liao, and Michael S. Weisbach, 2012, “Determinants of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions”, Journal of Finance, 67(3), 1045-1082. 
Fama, Eugene F., Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen, and Richard Roll, 1969, “The adjustment of stock 
prices to new information”, International Economic Review, 10(1), 1-21. 
Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French, 1993, “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and 
bonds”, Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1), 3-56. 
Fisman, Raymond and Jakob Svensson, 2007, “Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? 
Firm level evidence”, Journal of Development Economics, 83, 63-75. 
Gianetti, Mariassunta and Andrei Simonov, 2006, “Which investors fear expropriation? Evidence from 
investors’ portfolio choices, The Journal of Finance, 61(3), 1507-1547.  
Graham, John L., 1984, “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A new perspective”, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 15(3), 107-121. 
Graham, John R., Campbell R. Harvey and Hai Huang, 2005, “Investor competence, trading frequency, 
and home bias”, NBER Working Paper.  
Griffin, John, Clark Liu, and Tao Shu, 2016, “Is the Chinese anti-corruption campaign effective?”, SSRN 
Working Paper.  
32 
 
Hines, James R. Jr., 1995, “Forbidden payment: Foreign bribery and American business after 1977”, 
NBER Working Paper. 
Hong, Harrison and Inessa Liskovich, 2015, “Crime, punishment and the Halo effect of Corporate Social 
Responsibility”, SSRN Working Paper. 
Ince, Ozgur S. and R. Burt Porter, 2006, “Individual equity return data from Thomson Datastream: 
Handle with care!”, Journal of Financial Research, 29(4): 463-479. 
Kang, Jun-Koo and René Stulz, 1997, “Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio equity 
ownership in Japan”, Journal of Financial Economics 46, 3-28. 
Karpoff, Jonathan M., D. Scott Lee, and Gerald S. Martin, 2015, “The value of foreign bribery to bribe-
paying firms”, SSRN Working Paper. 
Karpoff, Jonathan M. and Paul H. Malatesta, 1995, “State takeover legislation and share values: The 
wealth effects of Pennsylvania’s Act 36”, Journal of Corporate Finance, 1, 367-382. 
Ke, Bin, Na Liu, and Song Tang, 2016, “The effect of anti-corruption campaign on shareholder value in a 
weak institutional environment: Evidence from China”, Working paper. 
Kho, Bong-Chan, René Stulz, and Francis E. Warnock, 2009, “Financial globalization, governance, and 
the evolution of home bias”, Journal of Accounting Research, 47(2), 597-635.  
Leuz, Christian, Karl Lins, and Frank Warnock, 2009, “Do foreigners invest less in poorly governed 
firms?”, Review of Financial Studies, 22, 3245-3285. 
Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1986, “A note on competitive bribery games”, Economic Letters, 22, 337-341. 
Lin, Chen, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, and Xiaofeng Zhao, 2016, “Anti-corruption reforms and 
shareholder valuations: Event study evidence from China”, NBER Working Paper.  
Mauro, Paolo, 1995, “Corruption and growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3): 681-712. 
Portes, Richard and Helene Rey, 2005, “The determinants of cross-border equity flows”, Journal of 
International Economics, 65(2), 269-296.  
Schipper, Katherine and Rex Thompson, 1983, “The impact of merger-related regulations on the 
shareholders of acquiring firms”, Journal of Accounting Research, 21(1): 184-221. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, 1993, “Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3): 
599-617. 
Smith, David B., Howard Stettler, and William Beedles, 1984, “An investigation of the information 
content of foreign sensitive payment disclosure”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 6, 153-162. 
Svensson, Jakob, 2003, “Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross section of firms.”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 207-230. 
Svensson, Jakob, 2005, “Eight questions about corruption”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 
19-42. 
Vickrey, William, 1961, “Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders”, Journal of 
Finance, 16(1), 8-37. 
Vickrey, William, 1962, “Auctions and bidding games” in Recent Advances in Game Theory, Princeton 
Conference Series, 29, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 15-27. 
Zhang, Ivy Xiying, 2007, “Economic consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 44: 74-11. 
33 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for variables used in event studies for U.K. firms (Panel A) and non-U.K. firms (Panel 
B), as well as in the analysis of firms’ responses to the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act (Panel C). Appendix 1 provides 
detailed variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. In Panels A and B, 
observations are at the firm-level using 2008 data, with the exception of Cumulative abnormal returns, which denote abnormal 
returns relative to March 25, 2009 (when the draft of the U.K. Bribery Act was passed) and the next day. In Panel A, firms are 
additionally split by Foreign subsidiary, a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm has at least one subsidiary outside of the 
U.K. in 2008. In Panel B, firms are split by U.K. subsidiary, a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm has at least one 
subsidiary in the U.K. in 2008. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In Panel C, observations 
are at the firm-year level (except Subsidiary revenues ($000s), which is at the subsidiary-year level) over the 2007-2012 period.  
 
Panel A: U.K. firms 
 
 
Mean SD Median # Obs Foreign 
Subsidiary 
Difference 
 
    Yes No   
         
Cumulative abnormal returns CAR[0;1] -0.43% 2.38% -0.52% 1,097 -0.55% -0.27% -0.28% ** 
         
Corruption exposure 2.56 0.79 2.30 1,244 2.76 2.30 0.46 *** 
         
Market value ($mn) 1,772 9,813 107 1,244 2,833 400 2,433 *** 
         
Number of subsidiaries 41.4 256.9 9.0 1,244 65.4 10.3 55.1 *** 
         
FTSE4Good (dummy) 16.1% 36.7% 0.0% 1,244 22.4% 7.9% 14.5% *** 
         
ADR (dummy) 17.6% 38.1% 0.0% 1,244 25.6% 7.2% 18.4% *** 
         
U.S. subsidiary (dummy) 30.2% 45.9% 0.0% 1,244 56.4% 0.0% 56.4% *** 
         
U.S. link (dummy) 37.9% 48.5% 0.0% 1,244 61.6% 7.2% 54.4% *** 
         
Foreign subsidiary (dummy) 56.4% 49.6% 100.0% 1,244    
 
         
 
 
Panel B: Non-U.K. firms 
 
         
 
Mean SD Median #Obs U.K. Subsidiary Difference 
 
    Yes No  
 
         
Cumulative abnormal returns CAR[0;1] 0.27% 3.45% -0.02% 9,457 0.36% 0.24% 0.12%  
         
Corruption exposure 3.48 1.77 2.72 11,662 2.93 3.69 (0.76) *** 
         
Market value ($mn) 2,824 12,600 339 11,662 5,856 1,668 4,188 *** 
         
Number of subsidiaries 27.8 125.4 8.0 11,662 64.3 13.9 50.4 *** 
         
FTSE4Good (dummy) 2.6% 16.0% 0.0% 11,662 6.8% 1.0% 5.8% *** 
         
ADR (dummy) 10.9% 31.2% 0.0% 11,662 18.5% 8.0% 10.5% *** 
         
U.S. subsidiary (dummy) 45.7% 49.8% 0.0% 11,662 73.2% 35.2% 38.0% *** 
         
U.S. link (dummy) 51.7% 50.0% 100.0% 11,662 78.5% 41.5% 37.0% *** 
         
U.S. link (non-U.S. firm; dummy) 32.3% 46.8% 0.0% 6,749 64.7% 22.4% 42.3% *** 
         
Competes with U.K. firm outside OECD  43.2% 49.5% 0.0% 2,510 66.5% 31.4% 35.1% *** 
         
Foreign subsidiary (dummy) 58.6% 49.3% 100.0% 11,662 100.0% 42.8% 57.2% *** 
         
U.K. subsidiary (dummy) 27.6% 44.7% 0.0% 11,662     
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Panel C: Subsidiaries, mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and joint ventures (JVs) 
 
  
Mean SD Median # Obs 
    
          
          
  (i) Subsidiaries         
          
 Average number 21.7 104.9 6.0 84,256     
          
 % Subsidiaries in OECD 63% 44% 92% 84,256     
          
 % Revenues OECD 73% 43% 100% 84,256     
          
 % Firms with OECD subsidiary 73% 45% 100% 84,256     
          
 % Firms with non-OECD subsidiary 54% 50% 100% 84,256     
          
 Subsidiary revenues ($mn) 311 602.7 15.1 784,464     
          
          
  (ii) Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As)         
          
 Average number 1.8 1.8 1.0 16,675     
          
 % Target in OECD 76% 41% 100% 16,675     
          
 % Firms with OECD M&A target 79% 41% 100% 16,675     
          
 % Firms with non-OECD M&A target 30% 46% 0% 16,675     
          
          
  (iii) Joint Ventures (JVs)         
          
 
Average number 2.9 1.7 2.0 2,250     
          
 
% Partner in OECD 41% 48% 0% 2,250     
          
 
% Firms with OECD JV partner 43% 50% 0% 2,250     
          
 
% Firms with non-OECD JV partner 62% 49% 100% 2,250     
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Table 2 
Firm value of U.K. firms around passage of the U.K. Bribery Act 
 
This table relates returns of U.K. firms around the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act to firm characteristics. The sample consists 
of all publicly listed U.K. firms, with the exception of column (4), which focuses on U.K. firms with at least one foreign 
subsidiary. The dependent variable is Cumulative abnormal returns [0;1] in columns (1)-(5) and Cumulative raw returns [0;1] 
in column (6). These returns are relative to March 25, 2009 (when the draft of the U.K. Bribery Act was passed) and the next 
day. In columns (1)-(4) and (6), Corruption exposure is constructed weighing each subsidiary equally. In column (5), 
Corruption exposure is constructed weighing each subsidiary by its revenue. Appendix 1 provides detailed variable definitions. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Industry fixed effects (Fama–French 48) are included as 
indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. t-statistics are given in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
    
Dependent variable: Cumulative abnormal returns  Cumulative raw returns 
Sample: All Firms All Firms All Firms 
Firms with 
Foreign 
Subsidiary 
All Firms 
 
All firms 
Corruption exposure 
measure: 
Equally 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Equally 
weighted 
Revenue 
weighted  Equally weighted 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
        
        
Corruption exposure -0.717** -0.838** -0.925** -0.791* -0.839*  -0.931** 
 (-2.08) (-2.26) (-2.42) (-1.85) (-1.92)  (-2.43) 
        
LN(Assets)   0.223 0.511 0.032  0.226 
   (1.00) (1.60) (0.21)  (1.01) 
        
LN(# Subsidiaries)   -0.204 -0.021 0.085  -0.206 
   (-0.64) (-0.05) (0.33)  (-0.64) 
        
FTSE4GOOD (dummy)   -1.306 -0.835 -0.623  -1.285 
   (-1.30) (-0.67) (-0.84)  (-1.28) 
        
US link (dummy)    -0.607 -0.500 -0.664  -0.587 
   (-0.81) (-0.52) (-1.16)  (-0.78) 
        
Beta       0.979 
       (0.77) 
        
Market-to-book       0.022 
       (0.70) 
        
Momentum       -0.728 
       (-1.18) 
        
        
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
        
N 1,097 1,097 1,097 618 935  1,097 
Adj. R2 0.004 0.043 0.055 0.096 0.046  0.055 
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Table 3 
Spillovers of the U.K. Bribery Act on direct competitors of U.K. firms 
 
This table relates returns of non-U.K. firms around the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act to firm characteristics. The dependent 
variable CAR is constructed as in Table 1. In columns (1)-(7), the key control variable is Competes with UK Firm outside 
OECD, a dummy variable set equal to 1 if at least one of a non-U.K. firm’s non-OECD subsidiaries competes directly with a 
U.K. firm’s subsidiary. A non-U.K. firm’s subsidiary is defined as competing directly with a U.K. firm if (i) that subsidiary is 
headquartered in the same non-OECD country as at least one U.K. firm subsidiary and (ii) that subsidiary operates in the same 
Fama-French 48 industry as the U.K. firm’s subsidiary. In column (8), competition with U.K. firms is measured by the 
logarithm of average sales made by those U.K. subsidiaries that compete directly with subsidiaries owned by respective non-
U.K. firms. No U.K. Subsidiary is a dummy equal to 1 if a non-U.K. firm does not have a U.K. subsidiary in 2008. Other 
controls are those included in Table 2 column (3) and described in Appendix 1. Sample firms are all firms headquartered 
outside the U.K. that have at least one non-OECD subsidiary. Columns (3)-(6) further reduce this sample to firms 
headquartered in certain regions and column (7) contains all non-U.K. firms. Fixed effects are included as indicated. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the country and industry level (2-
way). t-statistics are given in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Competition measure: Dummy  Sales 
Sample: 
All non-
U.K. 
Firms 
All non-
U.K. 
Firms 
OECD 
non-U.K.  
Firms 
OECD 
Non-U.S. 
Firms 
U.S. 
Firms 
 
Non-
OECD 
Firms 
All non-
U.K. 
Firms 
 All non-
U.K. Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
          
          
U.K. Comp. X No U.K. Sub  0.514* 0.380 0.520 0.320 0.973*** 0.591*  0.093** 
  (1.91) (1.21) (1.32) (0.58) (3.08) (1.80)  (2.07) 
          
U.K. Competition 0.239 -0.012 -0.075 0.163 -1.101* 0.056 0.118  -0.058 
 (0.99) (-0.07) (-0.30) (0.61) (-1.88) (0.25) (0.79)  (-1.58) 
          
No U.K. Subsidiary 0.059 0.117 0.047 0.204 -0.235 0.408*** 0.143  -0.008 
 (0.81) (1.25) (0.40) (1.45) (-1.26) (2.83) (1.50)  (-0.05) 
          
Corruption exposure -0.060 -0.009 -0.026 -0.053 0.022 0.021 -0.009  -0.023 
 (-1.38) (-0.37) (-0.67) (-1.22) (0.30) (0.64) (-0.33)  (-0.31) 
          
Constant & Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 
Country X Industry FE Y Y Y Y N Y Y  Y 
Industry FE - - - - Y - -  - 
          
          
N 2,510 2,510 2,068 1,254 814 442 9,457  2,510 
Adj. R2 0.058 0.059 0.064 0.035 0.054 0.081 0.018  0.061 
          
 
37 
 
Table 4 
Geographic exposure 
 
This table relates changes in firms’ Corruption exposure (Panel A) and number of subsidiaries by region (Panel B) between 
2007 and 2012 to firm characteristics. In Panel A, the dependent variable Corruption exposure is constructed as described in 
Table 1, although subsidiary data are from Orbis for 2007-2012 and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
for 2008 is used after 2008. The dependent variable in Panel B is the logarithm of the number of subsidiaries headquartered in 
OECD countries (columns (1)-(3)), non-OECD countries (columns (4)-(6)), and the 50 most corrupt countries by Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2007 (column (7)). Controls include the logarithm of total assets and fixed 
effects as indicated. Appendix 1 provides detailed variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the year and country level (2-way). t-statistics are given in parentheses; *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Corruption exposure 
 
 
Dependent variable: Corruption exposure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Early-Response X U.K. Firm  -0.040* -0.033* -0.021* 
  (-2.09) (-2.01) (-1.84) 
     
Late-Response X U.K. Firm  -0.051** -0.044** -0.032** 
  (-2.75) (-2.77) (-2.57) 
     
Early-Response 0.083** 0.088**   
 (2.87) (2.81)   
     
Late-Response  0.120*** 0.126***   
 (5.52) (5.20)   
     
Before Event X U.K.    0.014 
    (1.26) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Industry X Year FE N N Y Y 
     
     
N 84,256 84,256 84,256 84,256 
Adj. R2 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 
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Panel B: Number of subsidiaries 
 
          
Dependent Variable: LN (1 + #Subsidiaries headquartered in the OECD)  
LN (1 + #Subsidiaries headquartered 
outside the OECD)  
LN (1 + 
#Subsidiaries in 
50 countries 
perceived to be 
most corrupt) 
          
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
          
Early-Response X U.K. Firm  0.160** 0.123*** 
 
 0.039 0.013 
 
-0.014 
  (1.99) (3.12) 
 
 (1.81) (0.69) 
 
(-0.56) 
          
Late-Response X U.K. Firm  0.039 -0.004 
 
 -0.118** -0.129*** 
 
-0.145*** 
  (0.76) (-0.09) 
 
 (-4.54) (-5.39) 
 
(-8.06) 
          
Early-Response 0.191*** 0.175***  
 
0.238*** 0.235**  
 
 
 (4.54) (4.00)  
 
(2.73) (2.43)  
 
 
          
Late-Response 0.365*** 0.359***  
 
0.537*** 0.547***  
 
 
 (9.54) (8.93)  
 
(6.34) (5.79)  
 
 
          
Controls Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
 
Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
 
Y 
Industry X Year FE N N Y 
 
N N Y 
 
Y 
          
          
N 84,256 84,256 84,256 
 
84,256 84,256 84,256 
 
84,256 
Adj. R2 0.927 0.927 0.928 
 
0.872 0.872 0.875 
 
0.876 
          
 
 
 
39 
 
Table 5 
Subsidiary revenues 
 
This table relates revenues around the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act for a panel of firms (columns (1)-(5)) and subsidiaries (columns (6)-(7)) over the 2007-
2012 period to firm characteristics. In columns (1)-(5), the dependent variable is the logarithm of revenues generated by firms’ subsidiaries headquartered in 
OECD countries (columns (1)-(2)), in non-OECD countries (columns (3)-(4)), and in the 50 most corrupt countries by Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index in 2008 (column (5)). Columns (6) and (7) consider subsidiary-level revenues of subsidiaries that existed since 2007. Controls include the 
logarithm of total assets and fixed effects as indicated. Appendix 1 provides detailed variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the year and country level. t-statistics are given in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
           
 
LN(Firm revenues  
inside OECD) 
 
LN(Firm revenues  
outside OECD) 
 
LN(Firm rev. from 50 countries 
perceived to be most corrupt) 
 LN(Subsidiary Revenue) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) 
           
Early-Response X U.K. Firm 0.083** 0.085**  -0.019 0.003  -0.051**  -0.053  
 (2.26) (2.22)  (-0.41) (0.06)  (-2.32)  (-0.99)  
           
Late-Response X U.K. Firm 0.016 -0.037  -0.149*** -0.119**  -0.277***  -0.145***  
 (0.28) (-0.23)  (-2.93) (-2.27)  (-6.31)  (-2.61)  
           
Early-Response 0.142**   0.134***     0.032  
 (2.24)   (7.60)     (1.11)  
           
Late-Response 0.334***   0.313***     0.041  
 (11.28)   (16.97)     (1.22)  
           
Mid-Response X U.K. Firm          -0.016 
  X Corruption exposure          (-1.63) 
           
Post-Response X U.K. Firm          -0.033*** 
  X Corruption exposure          (-3.87) 
           
Early-Response          0.035*** 
  X Corruption exposure          (3.16) 
           
Late-Response          0.061*** 
  X Corruption exposure          (5.19) 
           
Controls Y Y  Y Y  Y  Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y  Y Y  Y  N - 
Subsidiary FE N N  N N  N  Y Y 
Industry X Year FE N Y  N Y  Y  N Y 
Country X Year FE N N  N N  N  N Y 
           
           
N 84,256 84,256  84,256 84,256  84,256  784,464 784,464 
Adj. R2 0.901 0.901  0.804 0.807  0.814  0.950 0.951 
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Table 6 
Merger & acquisition and joint venture activity 
 
This tables relates changes in the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&As; Panel A) and joint ventures (JVs; 
Panel B) by target region for 2007-2012 to firm characteristics. Data are obtained from Zephyr. In Panel A, sample 
firms are firms that engaged in at least one M&A activity during the sample period. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of (1 + the number of M&A targets headquartered in OECD countries) (columns (1)-(2)) and the 
logarithm of (1 + the number of M&A targets headquartered in non-OECD countries) (columns (3)-(4)), set to zero 
in years in which firms did not conduct an M&A. In Panel B, sample firms are firms that engaged in at least one JV 
activity during the sample period. The dependent variable is the logarithm of (1 + the number of JVs with partners 
headquartered in OECD countries) (columns (1)-(2)) and the logarithm of (1 + the number of JVs with partners 
headquartered in non-OECD countries) (columns (3)-(4)), set to zero in years in which firms did not conduct a JV. 
In both panels, controls include the logarithm of total assets and fixed effects as indicated. Appendix 1 provides 
detailed variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors are 
clustered at the year and country level. t-statistics are given in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at  the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
LN(1 + # Targets in OECD) 
 Dependent Variable: 
LN(1 + # Targets outside OECD) 
  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Early-Response X U.K. Firm 0.032 0.047  -0.066* -0.076** 
 (0.94) (1.20)  (-2.09) (-2.68) 
      
Late-Response X U.K. Firm 0.028 0.044  -0.051 -0.058 
 (0.92) (1.39)  (-1.32) (-1.43) 
      
Early-Response -0.125**   0.001  
 (-3.51)   (0.06)  
      
Late-Response -0.087**   -0.007  
 (-3.13)   (-0.59)  
      
Controls Y Y  Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y  Y Y 
Industry X Year FE N Y  N Y 
      
      
N 16,675 16,675  16,675 16,675 
Adj. R2 0.418 0.420  0.440 0.439 
      
 
Panel B: Joint ventures (JVs) 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
LN(1 + # Partners in OECD) 
 Dependent Variable: 
LN(1 + # Partners outside OECD) 
  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Early-Response X U.K. Firm  -0.072   0.144 
  (-0.31)   (0.50) 
      
Late-Response X U.K. Firm  -0.048   -0.281 
  (-0.34)   (-0.42) 
      
Early-Response -0.059 -0.045  -0.019 -0.032 
 (-1.01) (-0.67)  (-0.11) (-0.21) 
      
Late-Response -0.126 -0.118  -0.042 -0.031 
 (-1.42) (-1.19)  (-0.28) (-0.17) 
      
Controls Y Y  Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y  Y Y 
Year FE Y Y  Y Y 
      
      
N 2,250 2,250  2,250 2,250 
Adj. R2 0.279 0.313  0.242 0.242 
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Figure 1 
Newspaper articles around passage of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 
This figure shows the number of newspaper articles related to bribery regulation that were published in major U.K. 
newspapers around the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 on March 25, 2009. The figure is based on a Factiva 
search in U.K. newspaper articles that include the term “bribery” and the term “United Kingdom” (or “Britain”) but 
do not include the terms “cricket,” “Olympic,” “football,” or “contract notice.” Newspaper articles published after 8 
pm in the online version are dated to the following day; duplicate articles are omitted. 
 
 
 
 
